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Childness or Child-less: Signs taken for wonders 
 
Abstract.  
It is argued that there are several problems with Peter Hollindale’s concept, 
“childness.”  First, it is suggested that the term not only has too much semantic 
latitude, but that its definitional attributes are themselves incompatible, pulling in 
different directions: from the pragmatic and empirical to the more figurative and 
aspirational. Linked with this point is a second one: that despite Hollindale’s 
avowed claim that his term is ‘extremely flexible, and … historically, socially and 
culturally determined’ (pp. 76-7), it ultimately defers to a biological essentialism. 
Thirdly, and as a result of this, the term fails adequately to address many key issues 
in children’s literature criticism, despite Hollindale’s otherwise exemplary and 
perceptive readings of texts. Finally, it is suggested that the key issue, of how 
childhood is seen to be constructed, confers on the child an unwarranted 
voluntarism that neglects questions of power (i.e. of socialisation and colonisation) 
probed by others, resulting in a rather Romantic conceptualisation of the child – 
and, indeed, of “childness.” 
 
 
Introduction 
Being here, with Peter Hollindale in the audience, reminds me very much of that scene from Woody Allen’s 
Annie Hall (2001) where Woody’s character and Annie are queuing for a film while the person behind them 
is deriding the work of Marshall McLuhan. Woody Allen takes issue and then dramatically produces 
McLuhan, who has been listening to the man in question from the other side of the lobby. McLuhan informs 
the man, a lecturer, “You know nothing of my work … How you ever got to teach a course in anything is 
totally amazing!”  So, we’ll see.   
From my side, I’d just like to say that I’ve admired Hollindale’s work since coming across his 1974 text, 
Choosing Books for Children, which, as a librarian at the time, I found invaluable.  I first met Peter in person 
in the early 1990s, and he was very generous to a, then, young scholar. So now, as an “old” scholar myself, I 
don’t want to seem in any way bigoted, and I certainly appreciated many of his close readings in Signs of 
Childness (1997), especially in Chapter 6, where he discusses Beatrix Potter’s Tale of Mr Tod and Robert 
Westall’s works. However, when it comes to Hollindale’s theoretical framework, I’ve always had problems. 
I’ll go straight to the heart of this before letting the detail unfold.   
Childness as a Concept 
For me, the main problem with Hollindale’s model arises from the complexity of that term, “childness.” He 
wants a word that will stand in place of “childhood,” which, he finds, is on the one hand often confined to 
meaning “early human development” and, on the other, as freighted with “all the qualities and limitations 
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which we associate with children” (1997, p. 44). His preferred term, “childness,” accordingly aims to explore 
“the quality of being a child,” but not simply from the perspective of childhood, which he terms “the first 
phase of childness”; for he also wants the term to encompass the perspective of maturity; what he terms a 
second, adult phase of childness. And beyond this, he argues that childness is ultimately about the interaction 
between these two phases, in which “[c]hildren’s literature is one such field of interaction” (p.76).  
The term, then, appears ontologically quite open, and Hollindale himself commends the concept for being 
“extremely flexible, and … historically, socially and culturally determined” (pp. 76-7) – just as, we might 
argue, the term “childhood” also is. However, despite noting the existence of such blighted young lives as 
those of child prostitutes, soldiers and miners, when we come to the adjectives Hollindale uses to depict 
childness, they refer only to idealised, western notions of childhood: “dynamic, imaginative, experimental, 
interactive and unstable” (p. 47). The less positive qualities by which children have been defined and 
fictionalised are absent from the above list, and marginal in Hollindale’s discussion of childness; for 
example, children being seen as sinful, feckless, evil, delinquent, inadequate, limited, exploited, abused, and 
so on.  One might argue that these more negative attributes emerge from adults, that is, from what Hollindale 
designates as the second phase of childness; however, we might also mention those aspects of childness that 
children are themselves thought to experience; for example, around sibling rivalry, gendered performance, 
fears about loss, death, disappearance and, later, around sexuality. But Hollindale is quite explicit about 
restricting the denotation of childness to “a shared set of pleasuring beliefs about childhood and child 
behaviour” (p. 47, my emphasis). Again, one wonders why this celebratory, Romantic conception of the 
child (in some ways parallel to Victorian males celebrating the female “angel in the house”) is allowed to 
circumscribe wider discussion about what “childness” – if adopted as a term – might involve. (As my 
colleague Vanessa Joosen pointed out, those with traumatic experiences when young are often described as 
having “no childhood” rather than, more dispassionately, a deleterious one.) 
Things are even more complicated, though, for any conception of childness is acceptable, in the final 
analysis, “only if children themselves freely recognize it” (60). Here, Hollindale’s notion of childness really 
seems to struggle, being tugged in contrary directions. For despite the child having this freedom, it seems 
that adults have already delimited the word’s denotation to positive, “pleasuring” qualities. It seems hard to 
envisage how this term, which in this instance has a far narrower remit than the term “childhood,” could ever 
be deployed as a critical tool – especially as such a disparate range of young people (across age, class, 
ethnicity, gender, etc.) are as unlikely to reach consensus as would adults agreeing about their “adult-ness.” 
This problem is related to another, for, despite often gesturing towards cultural variability (as quoted earlier), 
in practice Hollindale seems to ignore it. This occurs for two reasons. Firstly because, as just noted, the list 
quoted above is limited to the positive qualities of childhood only, despite noting some childhoods that are 
deeply lacking in these; and second, because cultural variability is undercut by Hollindale’s repeated 
deference to a biological essentialism.  
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So, at various places, rather than accepting that childhood has changed, Hollindale more assertively claims 
that it is being destroyed, particularly by the media which, he thinks, is “partly to blame for the marked 
foreshortening of childhood that is evident in modern western societies” (p. 17). Later this claim becomes 
more emphatic: “The media have turned fictional children into an endangered species and children’s 
literature is their conservation area” (p. 21).1  
It is worth pointing out at this juncture that Hollindale exempts books from “the media.” Clearly, because 
print has been around for so long, it is now seen to be a natural medium of communication. But to return to 
my main point, Hollindale does not countenance the notion that the media might be producing new forms of 
adult-child relations (just as, for some scholars, the book initially created the conceptual space of childhood). 
Hollindale, though, sees only the destruction of some essential part of childness. However, as those who 
have paid attention to moral panics around various forms of media have noted, such negative reactions have 
a suspiciously long history. John Springhall (1999) has detailed the various “media” destroyers of childhood 
from recent examples, like television and the internet back to early Victorian times (the 1830s), when “penny 
gaffs” were seen to be the cause. 2 These were cheap forms of theatrical entertainment for the poor, which 
were seen to turn their child audiences into “‘dwarfed, stunted men and women’” possessing “a precocious, 
self-reliant sharpness.” As Springhall comments, it is “difficult to reconcile with the idealized Victorian 
middle-class concept of childhood” (1999, p. 12). So, when Hollindale quotes a recent report expressing 
fears that children “are being thrust from childhood into a spurious adulthood” (p. 58), we might experience 
more than a hint of déjà vu.  
Unlike Springhall, Hollindale’s broadbrush attacks on the media are mostly asserted without supporting 
examples – as, disturbingly, are the anonymous swipes at “the modern theorist, critic, and ‘serious’ adult 
novelist,” all of whom are accused of seeing “no cohesion of personality or continuity of selfhood” (p. 69). 
Who are these people, though, especially those “serious” novelists? Such views are certainly not present in 
the work of Roddy Doyle, James Kelman, Pat Barker, Graham Swift, or Arundhati Roy – to take the five 
Booker Prize winners leading up to the 1997 publication of Hollindale’s work. And where, too, are these 
“modern commentators” who accuse us of playing what Hollindale terms “meaningless games” (p. 69)?    
Even when a source is occasionally mentioned to underpin a generalisation, it warrants scrutiny. For 
example, after declaring, “[i]n the topsy-turvy world we now present to children, supposedly mature adults 
often impose a premature adulthood on children (if only in the entertainments they think fit for them)” (p. 
61), he quotes examples from Christina Hardyment: the films Parenthood and Look Who’s Talking. The 
                                                     
1 Hollindale was writing at a fairly quiet time in terms of what he sees as “the media” (see main text on this), 
albeit Pixar (Toy Story, 1995- ) and Ardman (Wallace and Gromit, 1989- ) were active. Dreamworks and 
CBeebies were around the corner, however.  And in the new millennium, the influence of Harry Potter was 
immense, with many other children’s works being turned into TV and film adaptations. 
2 Neil Postman (1982) more recently accused TV of causing The Disappearance of Childhood (1982).  
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trouble is, the UK film board issued these films with 15 and 12 certificates, respectively, suggesting a far 
more nuanced awareness of what entertainments might be fit for particular ages (and, notably, Hollindale 
elsewhere complicates things by referring to “teenagers” as “neither child nor adult” [p. 11]). 
Regardless of these quibbles, the main question remains: is it a “premature adulthood” that is being imposed 
on children, or is there a cultural shift towards seeing children as more discerning and capable beings?  More 
succinctly, does it destroy childhood to give children an awareness of the world around them?  Of course, 
we’d all prefer not to have to think about ethnic cleansing, religious intolerance, refugees, poverty, 
environmental disaster, child abuse, violence and so on, but many see an openness about these issues as 
healthier than earlier attempts at concealment (as with Victorian, middle-class children, as against those 
attending penny gaffs).  So, when Hollindale says that “the neo-children of our times” must find in children’s 
literature “reflections of the childness they experience directly” (pp. 110-11), I would argue that this is 
certainly happening. But I also think that it is such works that many others blame for the foreshortening of 
childhood, imposing a premature adulthood. I am thinking in particular of works that, similar to the material 
cited by Springhall, tend to give rise to moral panics; books such as Rose Blanche (Innocenti and Gallaz, 
1985), And Tango Makes Three (Richardson et al., 2005), Duck, Death and the Tulip (Erlbruch, 2008) and I 
am Jazz Herthel et al., 2014).3  It is certainly of note that signs of a “premature” adulthood are generally 
regarded with dismay, whereas an adult wishing to hold on to his or her “childness” is seen as laudable. 
Let me reiterate, though: it is Hollindale’s defence of a biological essentialism that makes these problems 
seem intractable, such that “the presentness of childhood” in the young prevents any reading relationship that 
“is not fully reciprocal in the way that is latently possible for adult readers of adult authors” (p. 22). But such 
essentialism, I’d argue, ties us in further knots, for he has elsewhere noted that a “male reader cannot read a 
novel by, say, Margaret Atwood as a woman reads it,” the former being, again, “biologically 
disenfranchised” (p. 10). Adults, it turns out, are not “fully reciprocal” either.  However, arguments from 
biology, I’d suggest, are inevitably reductionist for, as I have commented before, if one pursues the “identity 
politics” line, whether it is based on age, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, disability or even class, one finds one’s 
reading practices severely hobbled, such that “one would end up with only a 13¾ year-old-boy from a 
working-class, broken-home being able to appreciate the exploits of an Adrian Mole” (Rudd, 2005, p. 19). 
I would suggest that if Hollindale is really interested in “constructions of childhood” (p. 23), then the 
assertion that a child “is indeed a child, by biological definition, and therefore presumably entitled to behave, 
not like one, but as one” (p. 8) is less than helpful. Speaking specifically about gendered readings, I’d 
contend that Robert Scholes’s response to such declarations is more useful; he asks, “is there any difference 
between reading as a woman and reading like a woman?  Can Mary actually read as a woman because she is 
a woman, or can she only read like a woman because no individual can ever be a woman?” (2003, p. 311). In 
other words, Scholes is positing that there is no universal, archetypal “woman” for women to be, Scholes 
                                                     
3 For discussions of the controversies around these and other picture books, see Janet Evans (2015). 
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preferring to recognise that, like children, women exist in huge variety, albeit with discernible likenesses 
(what Ludwig Wittgenstein, also averse to essences, terms “family resemblances”). Such a view is shared by 
many, including the Victorian novelist, George MacDonald (an earlier promoter of the term “childness,” as 
Hollindale recognises), who famously declared, “I do not write for children but for the childlike, whether of 
five, or fifty, or seventy-five” (1893 p. ??). Thus, instead of seeing us adults as “obsolete,” to use 
Hollindale’s words, as “guests at the table of children’s literature, even if we ourselves have written it” (p. 
29, emphasis in original), we might see us all as habitués bearing party invites.  
Much of what Hollindale himself proclaims elsewhere, in fact, seems to endorse a wish for more continuity 
and overlap (e.g. the section “Some elements of composite childness”, pp. 79-83), as, indeed, the dialogical 
concept of “childness” makes clear. Thus, he writes: “Children take their time about ceasing to be children, 
going through long periods of being children when they feel like it and not when they don’t” (p. 25); and he 
elsewhere speaks of “an intermediate phase, when childhood is felt to be over but full adult maturity has not 
yet been reached” (p. 31), extending his definition, given earlier, of seeing childness as consisting of two 
phases. This middle phase, he says, “can last a long time,” and “we habitually misconceive it, in part by 
linking it to a specific age group” (p. 31). He also admits that “many adults, including most of those who 
write and read children’s books” believe “that their childhood is still alive in themselves” (p. 30) and quotes 
Ursula Le Guin’s famous statement “that an adult is not a dead child, but a child who survived” (p. 42). 
However, despite all this evidence of continuity, Hollindale still feels the need to maintain a biological 
barrier: “however ‘childish’ we [adults] are, we are disbarred by time and maturity from authentic re-entry 
into childhood imaginative responses” (p. 29).  But why cannot adults be granted the same latitude as 
children, being adults when they feel like it and not when they don’t?  
Why, too, if childhood is biologically determined, would a child have any need to be “constructing his or her 
own childhood” (p. 29)? How could it be otherwise?  Could a child end up as something else?  Taking the 
biological route, one might argue that children “just growed” (to use the phrase regularly attributed to Topsy 
in the hugely popular abolitionist novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin [1852]), just as young animals cannot help but 
mature. Childhood might then legitimately end when that person became, to use Hollindale’s words, 
“biologically disenfranchised” (p. 10).4   
If, on the other hand, childhood is something culturally constructed, such a claim is less tenable, and we need 
to ask, instead, what the components of this construction-kit might be. Haven’t these, in fact, been provided 
by the adult world, whose language children must have imbibed, including the very terms that delineate what 
it means to inhabit the world of childhood?  If this is so, then any notion of childhood agency can only come 
                                                     
4 This term is interesting in the way it mixes biology and culture: “disenfranchised” rather than “terminated” 
say, or more simply, “matured”. Though Hollindale wishes to see these as interrelated, he will not countenance 
the idea that biology is itself culturally informed. 
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from what the child does with these components.  In which case, the child, as much as anyone else, is 
reconstructing its sense of being in the world. 
Such reconstruction, then, depends on our ability to imitate and empathise with others, whether from fiction 
or everyday life. So, while it might be a character from Tom’s Midnight Garden that influences us, it might 
equally be an individual admired at school. It need not be a child figure, either. As a youngster in the 1950s, I 
confess to reading far too many comics and watching excessive amounts of TV. I remember fantasising that I 
was Superman, Davy Crockett and Popeye (amongst others); nor do I seem to have been alone in this, either.  
We might recall Wordsworth’s confessions about his childhood reading: 
Oh! give us once again the Wishing-Cap 
Of Fortunatus, and the invisible Coat  
Of Jack the Giant-killer, Robin Hood, 
And Sabra in the forest with St. George! 
The child, whose love is here, at least, doth reap  
One precious gain, that he forgets himself.  
(“The Prelude,” [1805], Wordsworth 1970, p. 156) 
 
There’s hardly a fictional child in sight here. So, to move the argument on, I am suggesting that a sense of 
“childness” is not particularly central to the child’s construction of its identity. This sense is something 
provided by the adult world. The child, I’d suggest, is therefore more interested in what might be termed 
“adultness,” if one wants to adopt such terms; or, more neutrally, one might say that that the child is 
concerned with its human rights. 
 
Biology is not being dismissed here, it is simply being “disbarred” as something that, however amorphously, 
divides humans on the criterion of age. Recently, Joshua Hartshorne, co-author of one of the largest studies 
of human development, concludes, “At any given age, you’re getting better at some things, you’re getting 
worse at some other things, and you’re at a plateau at some other things” (Trafton, 2015, n.p.) – a view that 
finds echoes in Maria Nikolajeva’s contribution to this issue.  But even without such research, this insight has 
been voiced by others, like Joan Aiken, whom Hollindale quotes: “most people’s occupations are pursued at 
a number of different levels – at varying mental ages” (p. 50). She adds that one might pursue business like a 
50-year-old, marriage like a 20-year-old, and one’s hobbies as someone aged 10.  Hollindale argues for a 
similar flexibility, especially when he expands his case to consider “youth,” which lasts “well into our 
twenties before the process is over” (p. 60).  It is worth noting that the Society for Adolescent Medicine also 
initially had the mid-twenties as the termination of adolescence, but then, in 2002, extended that period to the 
age of 34 (Danesi, 2003, p. 162), which emphasises how sociocultural factors (such as contemporary youth’s 
economic dependence) impacts on such constructions. But setting aside this confounding factor, if one were 
to accept the twenties as a cut-off point for this “process,” that would still make quite a few of the children’s 
7 
 
authors that Hollindale quotes eligible as youths, thereby having, in his terms, the “presentness” of 
childhood; hence, Enid Blyton, Roald Dahl, Alan Garner, Janni Howker, William Mayne, Arthur Ransome, 
Geoffrey Trease and Jill Paton Walsh would all qualify.5 
But my point in undertaking this exercise is simply to ask: why should their age make a difference? In what 
ways do these writers’ works change when their childhood/youth has been “closed … by full entry into adult 
life” (p. 60)?  Why, for example, is an adult’s memory of an incident occurring at the age of five any less 
authentic than a 15-year-old’s memory of the same childhood event?  It seems to be a “recollection” (or 
“reconstruction”) in both cases. One surely does not wait until adulthood before one begins this process of 
reconstructing.  
To bring together a number of these differences that I have with Hollindale, let me turn to his reason for 
adopting the Shakespearean coinage, “childness,” which originates in a speech by Polixenes in The Winter’s 
Tale, where this father is talking about his son, Florizel:   
                                           If at home, sir, 
He's all my exercise, my mirth, my matter: 
Now my sworn friend, and then mine enemy; 
My parasite, my soldier, statesman, all: 
He makes a July's day short as December; 
And with his varying childness cures in me 
Thoughts that would thick my blood. (Shakespeare, 1963, p. 15) 
I have several observations about this. First, there is Hollindale’s insistence that, “[i]n playing with Florizel, 
Polixenes is not ceasing to be an adult; he is not playing as a child plays” (p. 47). Why, I’d ask, again, does 
Hollindale feel it necessary to separate adult and child, rather than see their respective ages, especially in 
play, as irrelevant? Surely, the play is the thing.  
The second point to make is that we do not actually see father and son at play (if, indeed, they were playing): 
we have only the adult’s account of what it was like.6 Jacqueline Rose’s critique of children’s fiction is 
pertinent here, where she points out that fictional children are always adult creations. I’ll return to this point 
shortly but, first, I have one final observation about Hollindale’s conceptualisation of “childness”; for he 
declares here that “[i]t is by our childness that we grow” (p. 46), and it is with this pronouncement that the 
word moves further away from what might be potential qualities of childhood to a more figurative notion of 
childness, invoking it as almost an energising principle of life: a vitalism, perhaps, most readily encapsulated 
                                                     
5 I am taking authors’ first published works as the criterion here.  Many, of course, went on writing into “old 
age.” 
 
6 Polixenes’ comment seems to mirror Leontes’ similar remark about his own son, who “[p]hysics the subject, 
makes old hearts fresh” (Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale, 1.1, 37-38). 
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in another Peter’s declaration, “I’m youth, I’m joy …” (from Peter Pan [Barrie, 1995, p. 145] of course, a 
text with which Hollindale is closely associated). This association of youth with vitality is certainly in line 
with one of the main themes of The Winter’s Tale: of spring versus the winter of life, with Polixenes voicing 
his own nostalgic view of childhood, even using Pan-like terms as he describes himself as once “Boy 
Eternal” (Shakespeare, 1963, p. 9).  This is all fine, but if Hollindale is going to use the term “childness” in 
this more figurative way, it cannot simultaneously be restricted by chronology. It becomes something 
intrinsic to life itself: being dynamic, experimental and unpredictable are certainly not qualities exclusive to 
childhood. 
So, to recap briefly, I’ve suggested that Hollindale’s conception of childness is “impossible,” though not 
quite in the sense in which Rose uses that term.7 Whereas Rose’s conception of the child is ineluctably 
cultural, Hollindale’s childness is more conflicted. On the one hand he insists on a biological divide between 
child and adult but, on the other, he seeks to argue for a more cultural dimension in which there is a 
pragmatically negotiated understanding of childness that both children and adults share; however, children – 
as biologically distinguishable beings – always have the final say in what that childness consists of. And 
regrettably, in this model we also need a third hand, in which childness has a more philosophical, figurative 
dimension, where it seems to be synonymous with terms like joie de vivre, exuberance, animation.  
Childness and Children’s Fiction 
Let me now return to Rose’s point, which brings us more centrally to the matter of children’s fiction, 
something that, she claims, “sets up the child as an outsider to its own process, and then aims, unashamedly, 
to take the child in” (1984, p. 2).  For it is of note that, though Hollindale readily speaks about 
“constructions,” he steers clear of the more normal collocation, “social construction,” which connotes the 
sense of a child being more constructed than constructing. Hence, for a poststructuralist like Michel 
Foucault, the child is shaped by various discourses of society: of family, education, health, law, religion, and 
so on. Hollindale, however, clearly wishes to see children in more autonomous terms, such that adults are 
reduced to being mere “guests at the table of children’s literature” and, thereby, “obsolete” (p. 29). In this 
way Hollindale seeks to oppose the “social” to the “imaginative.” Children, thereby, “construct childhood as 
they go along, and … do so from fictions of various kinds, not merely from social experience” (p. 14). But 
just as he wishes to see books as standing apart from “the media,” so he also wishes to see these fictions as 
being somehow free of social mediation. And yet fictions equally are fashioned out of language, whether as 
formal stories, anecdotes or mere gossip (and regardless of whether they are published or orally regaled). 
This language, moreover, precedes the child, the child becoming a social being – in fact, even coming to see 
                                                     
7 “Children's fiction is impossible, not in the sense that it cannot be written (that would be nonsense), but in that 
it hangs on an impossibility, one which it rarely ventures to speak.  This is the impossible relation between adult 
and child” (Rose, 1984, p. 1). 
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itself as a “child” – precisely by learning to communicate (an infant’s early sounds, even before language, 
gradually come to reflect the phonology of its particular linguistic community).  
The child’s world, therefore, is socially mediated from the outset, through language and culture, whether the 
child rehearses these skills externally (in social interaction), internally (in imaginative play) or in a mixture 
(storying). So, when Hollindale complains (once again) that “[t]he child whose fantasy life is built from … 
[adult TV] programmes is obliged to construct an imaginative childhood out of fictions of adult behaviour, 
not children’s” (p. 17), I would want to make several observations. First, of course, to point out that, unless 
this child is fed TV 24/7, that child will still be “constructing” childhood in interaction with real people: 
parents and carers, siblings and friends (i.e. fellow children). Second, to consider what the raw material of 
children’s play consists of; for it chiefly comprises role-playing the adult world – as noted before -  whether 
that involves dolls, playing house, Doctors and Nurses, battling aliens, gang rivalry or word play (in Richmal 
Crompton’s stories, William’s play almost invariably arises out of his reflections on the adult world). 
Finally, and coming to the nub of Hollindale’s point, it needs stressing that even if children were to be fed a 
24/7 diet solely of children’s literature– “their conservation area” (21) according to Hollindale – such 
fictions, just like the TV programmes, are still the product of “obsolete” adults. So, when Hollindale claims 
that “an adult cannot read a novel by, say, Roald Dahl as a child reads it” (10), it needs emphasising that 
Dahl himself was in his fifties when his children’s books became popular. So, the question arises, what sort 
of authentic childness can Dahl inhabit?  
Personally, I’d argue, as I have done elsewhere, that there is no such essence of childness at all. What 
children can relate to in Dahl are feelings of being disempowered, bullied, tongue-tied, ignorant, inferior, 
vulnerable, and so forth (as we see in Charlie, in James, and in the unnamed boy protagonist of The Witches): 
feelings that Dahl does not simply represent in his children’s books but ones that are seen to be surmounted 
thanks to the help of some champion (Matilda, the BFG, the unnamed boy’s Norwegian grandmother). To 
my mind, this is why child characters per se are not essential – they are, in fact, generally lacking in 
traditional folk and fairy stories (cf. Joosen, 2018). Rather, to use Vladimir Propp’s terms (1968), what is 
important is the roles particular characters play.  Authenticity, in short, is not as important as credibility.  For 
me, then, it is less about providing “imaginary children” (p. 15) than imaginary characters, which will only 
fail to engage if that suspension of disbelief is compromised. I think children no more read for “childness,” 
in fact, than I, as an adult, approach a book seeking “adultness.” 
Given children’s relative disempowerment, then, it seems disingenuous to speak about adults as “participant 
observers.” A more apposite anthropological term would seem to be “colonisers” (Rose, 1984; Nodelman, 
1992). Reognition of their lesser status, in fact, makes it more comprehensible as to why a “disparaging” 
word like “childish” thrives, to Hollindale’s consternation, whereas his suggested alternative, “the approving 
word ‘childly’”, remains “obscure” (p. 54); for the word itself is not the problem: it is the connotations, 
which are just as likely to attach themselves to alternative coinages. This is the process of semantic 
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derogation – something experienced by all relatively powerless groups: the mentally challenged, people of 
colour, those with disabilities, and women, too – where vocabulary continually attracts negative associations 
(“womanish,” “girlish,” “girly,” “cutey”, “trouble-and-strife,” etc.). 
In this way, the process of colonisation proceeds, at least in a metaphorical sense, just as it is evident in 
Hollindale’s own text where, despite his claims that “children need to come across a variegated imaginary 
world of childhood, a multiplicity of childhood possibilities” (p. 15), the texts he refers to are predominantly 
about middle-class, almost exclusively white characters (not that Hollindale was alone in this in the 1990s). 
It is hard to envisage how a child might challenge this. Malorie Blackman, recalling her own disappointment 
at feeling “totally invisible in the world of literature” (Rustin, 2013), certainly had to wait for adulthood in 
order to address this issue. Like many other children, her sense of childness was not so “freely recognize[d]” 
(p. 60) Although, this said, she still read widely, and made the imaginative leaps necessary.  
Once again, then, I’d suggest that it might be those very books – books that confront issues around ethnicity, 
gender and sexuality, often from smaller presses – that are the most censored, being seen to undermine a 
proper childhood (e.g. Magnuson [2011] on And Tango Makes Three). Notably, it is frequently in picture 
books that we find many of these issues challenged (aside from the examples given earlier, in the context of 
Blackman one might also mention a revolutionary work like Ezra Jack Keats’ The Snowy Day [1962]). 
Unfortunately, picture books – usually the first books a child encounters, and ones where adults are more 
often involved in the “reading event” (p. 49) – are generally absent from Hollindale’s work (I’ll mention the 
one exception presently).   
I am hoping that the relative absence of this form is not because it is often seen as most influenced by 
“postmodernist practices” (p. 64), for which Hollindale seems to have a personal dislike, proclaiming: “the 
postmodernist adult novel has actively repudiated linear cohesion…, leaving the inherited structural positives 
of logic, pattern, order, meaning, closure, to popular fiction such as detective stories and to children’s 
literature” (p. 63).  He even maintains that many authors have turned to children’s books for this reason, 
“because the world of the adult novel is unreceptive” (p. 39). 
Again, for the record, I’d argue that it was modernism that repudiated these narrative elements, most 
famously perhaps in the work of Dorothy Richardson, Virginia Woolf and the later James Joyce. But 
contrary to the stereotype, most adult literary authors – not genre-based ones, either – deploy fairly 
mainstream narrative techniques.8 It seems strange, and unnecessary, to erect such an artificial divide 
between children’s and adults’ fiction when there are so many continuities, especially given, as noted by 
Hollindale earlier, that children’s literature is already using postmodern techniques in an increasing range of 
                                                     
8 To keep with Booker prize contenders, to those mentioned earlier might be added: Kingsley Amis, Margaret 
Atwood, Beryl Bainbridge, Malcolm Bradbury, Anita Brookner, A.S Byatt, J.G. Farrell, Penelope Fitzgerald, 
William Golding, Mark Hadddon, Russell Hoban, John Irving, Kazuo Ishiguro, Ruth Prawer Jhabvala, Thomas 
Kenneally, David Lodge, John Le Carré, Stanley Middleton, Iris Murdoch, V.S. Naipaul, Paul Scott, David 
Storey, and Elizabeth Taylor. 
11 
 
areas. But adult and children’s literature, arising from the same cultural background, cannot be antipathetic, 
as, indeed, many writers have managed to demonstrate (most famously, perhaps, Roddy Doyle, Mark 
Haddon, Russell Hoban and Salman Rushdie). It is also worth reminding ourselves that it is a children’s 
book that is credited with influencing the whole development of modernist writing techniques: Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland (Dusinberre, 1999).   
The notion that there could be “serious difficulties if at any period there is a gulf too wide to be easily 
bridged between the childness of adult constructs and the childness of children” (p. 49) thus seems 
untenable. It is a fear expressed by the fictional children’s writer in Russell Hoban’s Turtle Diary, that “a 
generation of children will come along and say, “This is not a world, this is nothing, there’s no way to live at 
all’” (1975, p. 100). But it is hard to see how a child, who can only have gleaned “the knowledge and 
acceptance that one is a child” (Hollindale, 1997, p. 49) from adults, could then reject the fictional 
constructions of the child offered by that same culture. I appreciate Hollindale’s point that earlier 
representations of childhood might be more alien to the young, but I would add that this is often because 
such depictions are also predominantly of white and middle-class children; or, if not, the representations are 
more likely to be crude stereotypes, and thus characters that children would not “freely recognize” (p. 60). 
Yet, as I have also maintained, many children still manage to imaginatively inhabit these varied 
constructions, just as they are able to inhabit adult characters – as is generally required with traditional tales 
(as celebrated by Wordsworth). Florizel himself, of course, is envisaged doing precisely this, playing at 
being a soldier and a statesman. And, in my own case, as I confessed, it was Superman and Davy Crockett 
who featured prominently. In fact, Hollindale himself provides a rich example from Beatrix Potter’s The Tale 
of Mr. Tod (arguably an early picture book), where he shows how the adult characters turn “topsy-turvy” 
and, thereby, engage us.9 
Hollindale’s fear, then, that if the childness which adults construct in children’s fiction “is inconsistent, or 
contradictory, or incompatible,” such books will leave children “disorientated, rootless and confused” (p. 49) 
– a fear similar to that expressed by Hoban’s children’s writer – seems unlikely. In fact, I would argue that it 
is the very variability of children’s books that allows the child to find his or her own fictional space, whether 
that lies in Blyton’s world, the Sweet Valley High series or elsewhere (pony stories, science fiction, the 
Gothic, chicklit or, indeed, in a veritable smorgasbord). It is, rather, a lack of variability, as experienced by 
Malorie Blackman and others, that is the greater concern, where there seems to be an attempt to colonise 
children around some hegemonic norm. 
Let me now be more direct in addressing Hollindale’s claim “that childness is the distinguishing property of 
a text in children’s literature, setting it apart from other literature as a genre ....” (p. 47), with which I also 
have several problems. The first one is that, as Hollindale himself later admits, childness is also characteristic 
of texts “meant for adults and embracing child readers only by chance” (p. 62) – exemplifying his case with 
                                                     
9 It is of note that, elsewhere, Hollindale is critical of “the topsy-turvy world we now present to children” (61).  
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L.P. Hartley’s The Go-Between – such that childness turns out not to be such a “distinguishing feature” after 
all. It is like being told that the distinguishing feature of zebras is their stripes, but then – as you approach a 
stripy beast – someone yells: “Oh, and tigers!” If anything, as Hollindale himself puts it more precisely 
elsewhere, he is actually concerned with “a literature of childhood” (p. 62).   
My second problem is connected with this, in that the term “children’s literature” is itself rather misleading. 
In an earlier attempt to define the area, Barbara Wall thus carefully limited herself to “writing for children – 
and in particular with fiction which fits this category – and not with what might more loosely be called 
‘children’s literature’” (1991, p. 1), finding the latter term too amorphous, “as incapable of definition as the 
term adult literature” (p. 2).  Hollindale himself, of course, deals almost exclusively with children’s fiction, 
and not those many other areas that are often seen to be part of children’s literature (or of children’s books): 
non-fictional work, poetry, nursery rhymes, nonsense, myths and legends.  
My final problem lies in defining children’s literature as a genre, but I will ignore this objection for the 
present (cf. Rudd, 2013) in order to hold on to this central question of whether, as Hollindale puts it, 
“childness is the distinguishing property of a text in children’s literature” (p. 47), having already agreed that 
his later claim, that he is discussing a “literature of childhood,” is more accurate.  
While it is certainly plausible for critics to examine how children are constructed in text, I am unconvinced 
that any such reflexive thought processes occur either in one’s everyday life or in one’s reading. In fact, I 
have suggested the opposite, taking my cue from Hollindale; namely, that life is often lived in its 
“presentness.” But when reflection does occur, it would seem to be less about one’s childness than one’s 
potential adultness (as soldier, statesman, superhero, etc.); or, more likely still, about more concrete issues: 
sibling rivalry, eating one’s greens, staying up late, for example.  In fiction, I think the same obtains, as I 
noted before; that is, it is not the childness that attracts one to a text but the dramatic situation itself, and the 
characters involved. Hence the hero can be a child but, equally, an adult or an altogether fantastic being. As I 
suggested earlier, it is relationships of power that are central (power encompassing Propp’s two main plot 
drivers, villainy and lack). 
Childness, itself, it seems to me, not only involves quite a small subset of this children’s fiction, but, as 
Hollindale himself acknowledges, features in a number of adult books too, and together these seem more 
properly termed a “literature of childhood.”  Even here, though, childness remains a slippery, overly elastic 
term, particularly when it is used to designate struggles over personal development, as captured in 
Hollindale’s phrase, quoted earlier, “by our childness we grow” (p. 46); for this is not a process that ever 
ends. Thus Hollindale’s extended examples of tales about young people learning to swim (pp. 116-23) could 
easily be extended to stories about more mature characters, like Neddy Merrill in John Cheever’s celebrated 
1964 short story, “The Swimmer” (1978), where we witness a middle-aged man seeking to return to his 
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home, after visiting friends, by swimming across all the suburban swimming pools that lie en route.10 What 
starts as a frivolous event in this story, though, turns into an existential quest as he meditates on the values of 
civilised life, on meaningfulness and the whole process of aging. 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have sought to show that there are several problems with Hollindale’s concept, “childness”. 
Primarily it is a term that has too great a semantic latitude, seeking not only to do too much, but also moving 
in incompatible directions. It is based not only on children’s perceptions of childhood but adults’ 
remembrances of it, too; beyond this, it depends on a conversation between children and adults about its 
qualities, though it is the children that are always give the final say. It is also concerned with the positive 
aspects of childhood only: children that are exploitable for their sexual attractiveness or their labour power 
have no place here. And finally, these more Romantic, positive features coalesce in a figurative notion of 
“childness,” in which the term seems to invoke Blakean qualities of vitality, joy and energy.  These are not 
viable bedfellows, such that the word as a concept cannot be operationalised without severe revision.  If 
Hollindale’s term is to have any purchase, I suggest, it is more likely to do so not in the area of children’s 
books, but in a “literature of childhood,” though even here, this would work only if the figurative aspect of 
the term – its concern with a far-more widespread joie de vivre – were relegated, as this is by no means the 
preserve of childhood, and is certainly not a biologically delimited phase. 
The other major conclusion is that Hollindale’s analysis, again in a Romantic vein, gives the child too much 
autonomy in constructing itself.  Hollindale not only neglects what others have termed the socialisation or 
colonisation of children, but also ignores the debates around this idea (as explored, for instance by Rose and 
Nodelman, amongst others).  The adults who are “invited to the table” are not simply guests. They also 
organised the party, furnished the decorations and attractive feast, and legislated over appropriate table 
manners. 
Which brings me, finally, and long overdue, to my subtitle. For the phrase “signs taken for wonders” comes 
from Homi Bhabha, indicating the way the “good book,” the Bible, was assumed by English colonisers to 
represent and justify British rule, literally bringing the colonised “to book.” However, as Bhabha also makes 
plain, the god-given mandate of the British, seemingly secure in their racial superiority, never met with the 
compliance they hoped for: rather than underline British rule, the signs of the Bible tended to undermine it, 
presenting readers with ambiguities and uncertainties. Just so, I’d suggest, children’s literature proffers 
constructions of childhood that not only celebrate but also readily undermine the traditional, Romantic 
                                                     
 
10 Jamie O’Neill’s At Swim, Two Boys (2001) appeared after Hollindale’s book was published, but it is another 
excellent example of developing manhood, also using swimming as a motif. 
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conception of the child. The wondrous signs of childness that Hollindale seeks to delimit – “dynamic, 
imaginative, experimental” (etc.) – instead disperse in a recognition of the far more varied childhoods on 
offer, both in the texts available and in the eclectic versions of childhood (and adulthood) itself that confront 
us today.  
This said, our own “Marshall McLuhan” might take a different view!  
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